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A CONVERSATION ON FEDERALISM AND THE STATES: 
THE BALANCING ACT OF DEVOLUTION 
Welcome and Introduction: Martha F. Davis, Vice-President and 
Legal Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; Kate 
Stoneman Visiting Professor, Albany Law School (Fall 2000). 
Moderator: David L. Markell, Professor of Law at Albany Law 
School. 
Discussants: 
Andrew G. Celli, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau, New York 
State Attorney General's Office. 
Peter Edelman, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center and 
founder of the Law Center's family poverty clinic. 
Don Friedman, Senior Policy Analyst with the Community Food 
Resource Center. 
Peter Lehner, Chief of the Environmental Protection Bureau, New 
York State Attorney General's Office. 
Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Visiting Professor at the University of 
Maryland's School of Public Mfairs; Director of the Performance 
Management Project at the Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. 
Richard Nathan, Director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of 
Government, State University of New York at Albany. 
Erik D. Olson, Senior Attorney at the Natural Resources Defense 
Counsel, National Coordinator of the Campaign for Safe and 
Mfordable Drinking Water. 
Concluding Remarks: David L. Markell 
1091 
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Martha .Davis: 
I want to welcome everyone here today-the folks in the audience, 
as well as our distinguished speakers and others who are going to 
be participating in this afternoon's conversation on federalism. 
Putting together a program that covers such a broad range of issues 
and involves people from up and down the East coast is not simple. 
I want to make sure that I acknowledge the important roles played 
by the sponsors of this program, Albany Law School, the NOW 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Government Law Center 
here at Albany Law School and Patty Salkin the Director of the 
Government Law Center, and the Albany Law Review. The ALS 
Environmental Outlook and Environmental Law Society also 
contributed, as well as other folks from Albany who helped with 
logistical issues. 
One of the most important functions of higher education is not 
specialization, it's the opposite, broadening visions and making 
connections across substantive areas that sharpen our 
understanding of the world around us. That project is both the 
genesis of this conversation and also one of the things we hope to 
achieve this afternoon. This extended conversation started when 
Dave Markell and I started talking about our respective fields-I 
work in the area of welfare and civil rights and Dave works in 
environmental law-and we realized that in terms of federalism, we 
had a lot to share with each other about what was happening in our 
fields. Our thought was to broaden that conversation to include a 
wider range of people and to include folks like you in the audience 
as well. So we have assembled experts on civil rights, welfare, and 
environmental law. We could have also included patent law, labor 
law, international trade, and other areas where devolution is 
becoming an issue. 
What we want to do for the next two hours is explore the nature 
of the trend of devolution and the national/state interests that are 
implicated by these· shifts in responsibility through levels of 
government. Among other things, we will be looking for lessons 
that can be translated from one area to another. 
At the end of the day I'm sure that federalism will continue to be 
one of the most contentious and complex issues in U.S. governance. 
We are not aiming to solve anything this afternoon. But, I hope this 
conversation will illuminate some of ways that we can ensure that 
people benefit from this bi-Ievel system. I want to turn it over now 
to Dave Markell who will be our moderator. He is perfect for this 
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task as someone with experience in state government, with the 
federal system, and, most recently worked in Canada, so he has 
international experience as well. 
David Markell: 
Thank you, Martha. Welcome everybody. We have four questions 
to talk about today, as you can tell from the materials that were 
provided. We are going to start with Peter Edelman, who will begin 
our conversation by talking about some of the national interests 
that are at stake in these areas. 
Peter Edelman: 
I'm going to talk about welfare and poverty and civil rights and 
Shelley will talk about the environment. Much of what we assign to 
national responsibility is based on values that we don't articulate. 
It's based on attitudes that are not related so much to some intrinsic 
facts about who can do what best, and much more to politics. 
Poverty policy and welfare policy are rife with this. The spoken 
justifications for the trends, in recent years in particular, relate to 
the idea that states are closer to the people and, therefore, they 
know what's best, and the federal government is very far away. I 
would suggest that arrangements between the national government 
and the state and local governments in this area relate more to the 
hierarchy of attitudes that we have toward the poor, toward who is 
deserving and who isn't. 
The 1935 Social Security Act is a great example of what I'm 
talking about because there, in the same piece of phenomenally 
important legislation, we enacted three programs with differing 
federal-state divisions of authority: social security itself, 
unemployment insurance; and, welfare in the name of a program 
that became known as Aid to Families With Dependent Children. 
Social security is a nationally administered program with nationally 
set benefits. And I think, it is no accident that in our lexicon the 
elderly are regarded as the most deserving. Of course, the 
beneficiaries of social security are not just poor people. 
Unemployment insurance is at a middle level in terms of the 
federal/state balance. For welfare, benefit levels were left entirely 
to the states, and for thirty plus years it was tacitly assumed that 
state and local bureaucracies would deal with poor people in 
basically any way they wanted. 
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What's the difference among those three? As far as I can tell, it's 
a difference in our attitudes about who is the most deserving. If you 
consider whether there might be a national definition of benefit 
levels in welfare, you might well ask whether there is a state-by-
state difference in people's needs. There are some regional 
differences in cost of living, but, otherwise, you eat, you need 
shelter, and so on. The history of disability policy is very 
interesting in this regard because from 1935 until 1972 (apart from 
the addition of social security disability in the 1950s), disability was 
handled as a welfare category. There were separate welfare 
programs for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and they were 
structured the way Aid to Families With Dependent Children was 
structured. But, disability has gradually acquired acceptance as 
being a more deserving category and in the Social Security Act 
amendments of the 1950s and then with SSI, Supplemental 
Security Income, in the early 1970s we created a national definition 
and a the national floor. I would suggest that this was not because 
we suddenly decided that the federal government could do a better 
job than the states, but because there was a change in our attitudes 
about who is deserving. Welfare recipients weren't regarded as 
especially deserving in the first place, but the politics became even 
more negative. There was an insistent drum beat that people were 
too dependent, and on welfare for too long, so we decided we'll give 
far more discretion to the states and have much less federal 
oversight. I don't think that's a result of some elegant definition of 
federalism; I think it's about politics. 
Just a word about civil rights, since I've got that assignment here, 
too, at least implicitly. Again, much of the issue is about values, 
although in this case the last half of the twentieth century has seen 
more positive change. But, we used to hear states' rights over and 
over again. Those of us with gray in our hair will remember Sam 
Ervin standing on the Senate floor in the 1960s with his version of 
the Constitution that these matters of civil rights were really 
matters of states' rights. Maybe he was in good faith, maybe not, 
but it was certainly a code phrase for "don't tell us what to do about 
segregation in the South." Then we enacted the 1964, 1965, and 
1968 Civil Rights Acts, and the states' rights talk stopped. When 
Judge Bork was nominated for the Supreme Court in the late 1980s 
we were all waiting to see what he would say about Dred Scott and 
Brown v. Board 0/ Education. He said that Dred Scott was one of 
the worst decisions in history and he supported Brown v. Board 0/ 
Education. I won't go through the constitutional doctrine on those 
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cases, but suffice to say that from a pure "Borkian" point of view 
those were the wrong answers. The point is that we had arrived at 
a broad consensus about the need for national law in this field, 
although not to the exclusion of civil rights enforcement at the state 
level. We should leave room for stronger civil rights enforcement at 
the state level. But not weaker. 
Now there is somewhat of a cloud of doubt that has been cast by 
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Morrison, which 
throws into question the continued validity of the Commerce Clause 
justification for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So, it is not an idle 
question to ask just how radical this current Supreme Court is, and 
just how dangerous it is in areas where we thought there was a 
settled political and values consensus around the validity and merit 
of exercising national power. 
Shelley Metzenbaum: 
You've asked me to talk to the national interests in 
environmental law. I want to change the question a little bit, to 
ask, what are the interests of the people in this country that the 
national government is best able to serve? That gets me a little bit 
away from debating "national interests" versus "state interests." I 
fear that answering the question as you have asked it takes us 
down a very philosophical path. I prefer to address this question 
with a more practical bent. 
First, consider two reasons that we think about government 
playing a role in the environmental field. Two key reasons are 
"externalities" and "commons problems." "Externalities" refers to 
the ability of one party to impose costs on another party without 
compensating that other party for the costs, as with pollution. To 
deal with externalities, we establish environmental standards, or 
sometimes we charge those people who are creating those costs,. so 
that we'll get them to stop imposing those costs on other parties, or, 
so that we can at least compensate the parties who have been forced 
to bear the cost burden. There is no reason that the national 
government, or the state government, or local government can't set 
standards or establish charges. They can and they do. But those 
standards and charges don't operate in a vacuum. If one state sets 
a more stringent set of standards or costs than others it can be 
perceived as an unfriendly signal to business about the business 
climate in the state, and there's a very robust and brisk competition 
to attract business. So, essentially one reason we have national 
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environmental laws and standards is it functions as a cartel 
agreement-a monopoly agreement among states-not to compete 
away environmental quality. 
The problem of externalities is often thought of in terms of a 
business imposing costs on a community, but we also have 
externality problems which can cross state lines, where one state 
can impose costs on another state. Again, states could deal with 
that state by state. But if they did, there would be enormous 
transactions costs. They would have to negotiate every single time 
water spilled across state lines causing contamination problems or 
upsetting the ecological balance of downstream water bodies. So, to 
some extent we have established national standards because it 
reduces the transaction costs. It's just a much more efficient way of 
dealing with environmental problems that cross state boundaries. 
National standards can also reduce costs for companies that have 
to operate in multiple jurisdictions. So, if we want to think about 
the question of what benefits the people, and in this case the 
business in this country, sometimes national standards are 
attractive because it allows a company to respond with the same 
kind of response in every state and not have to adapt to the codes or 
environmental requirements of each individual state, or locality. Of 
course, if you're a company and you're more powerful than the local 
government or the state, you may, in fact, prefer the different 
adaptations, because you know you can get a better deal even if you 
have to deal state by state. If that's the case, when that occurs, 
where you have a company that's more powerful, again you start to 
see a reason for a national role, because the national government in 
that case can counterbalance the power of the local business, what a 
political scientist might refer to as the local elite. 
I also mentioned commons problems. This is a term commonly 
used by folks who do environmental policy. Commons problems 
arise when rational decisions by many individuals would deplete a 
community resource. It could, for example, refer to our water or our 
air. We could easily overuse them, just following our individual 
rational decision-making processes, and deplete resources beyond a 
sustainable level, even though we might want to protect those 
resources if asked. So, what we do in those cases, is we reach a 
collective agreement among ourselves to protect what we call the 
commons-to protect these resources. 
Well, a lot of times those agreements are much easier to do when 
they involve smaller groups and they're easier to do because you 
have trust among the parties. The boundaries of commons, like 
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water bodies, sometimes cross state lines, and, in that case, again, 
you have very strong need for a national role. 
Let me mention a few other reasons national action can be very 
important. One, very simply, I think we should be able to trust the 
safety of the air and water where we live and where we travel 
throughout the United States. That has long been an expectation 
that I think we have had as Americans. It's what Peter was talking 
about in terms of values. I think we believe that we have a quality 
of life in America that should entitle us, and I will use that word 
entitlement without trying to get into big debates that erupt in 
other policy areas on entitlement, but we should believe we are 
going to have clean air and water wherever we live. I don't think 
we want to lose that expectation about basic air and water quality 
decency. 
Increasing our confidence about what we consume is not only 
important to consumers, it also can be important to producers. 
Producers sometimes want national standards to build consumer 
confidence. Fish producers, for example, have tried to get national 
standards on quality of fish because they want to make consumers 
comfortable that they don't need to worry about where the fish come 
from; they can trust that the fish are safe to eat because of the 
national standards. So, you have both a consumer and a producer 
reason for national standards, in that case. 
Finally, let me talk a little bit about economies of scale in 
implementing regulatory programs. There are significant 
economies of scale. Setting standards requires research. It requires 
evaluation of new technologies. It requires evaluation of program 
design. It requires marketing so that those who are regulated know 
what they need to do. All of those activities need to be done, and 
you can do it one time or you can do it fifty times. And, it's certainly 
a whole lot cheaper to do it one time. So, in that case it makes 
sense to have some cooperation among the parties, to do research on 
what the right water quality standard is. 
It doesn't have to be the national government that would do that. 
It could be a collection of states that have decided that they're going 
to work together on those standards, on the research, or whatever. 
The fact is though, while many states participate in interstate 
collaborative efforts, very few of them, very few of the state 
legislators have been willing to step forward and pay for that 
activity. The federal government has funded most of that activity. 
One other area that Peter alluded to was unemployment 
insurance, there is a lot of risk sharing and risk spreading that's 
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best done at a national level. Or, it can be done on a national level 
so that if you have a major incident in one location, the local 
government doesn't have to bear the full cost of the loss. You can 
think about it as what we do with federal emergency management. 
And that happens in the environmental field a lot when you have 
major environmental problems. 
In sum, there are lots of reasons that we have a role, an 
important role, a major role, a primary role in many cases, for the 
national government. 
So why bother with state and local government? Well, there are a 
lot of reasons to have the state and local governments deliver some 
of these services and I'm not going to go into them right now. What 
I am going to say is that I think it is part of the brilliance of the 
federalist system that we live in, that the line, the delineations 
about roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined. And, as a 
result, governments do compete to serve a shared set of citizens. 
It's in that competition, in many ways, that our values can best be 
served. We can go to a different level of government for responsive 
policies, if one level is not meeting our needs. And so, the different 
levels of government both compete for the shared citizenry and 
check each other's powers, if the power of one gets too strong. I 
think it's that constant tension rather than a clean delineation of 
roles that is a critical part of the vibrancy of our democratic system. 
David Markell· 
Peter and Shelley have raised a couple of important questions. 
One is, who should decide what national interests are, and the 
second is whether there should be particular criteria that should 
guide the decision makers in making that call. And I think implicit 
in Peter's remarks is that, essentially, Congress has a role to play in 
deciding what national interests are. Congress' decisions may not 
always be entirely satisfactory. In fact, they may vary across a 
range of activities in a way that sometimes doesn't make much 
sense. But, Peter suggests that Congress is the ultimate decision 
maker in terms of defining what a national interest is, constrained 
by the courts basically. 
Shelley offered some of the substantive criteria that might guide 
Congress and others who are interested in deciding what the 
national interests are-e.g., things like "a race to the bottom" 
among states, "externalities," "commons problems." So, I would like 
to pose those two questions to the other panelists. First, who should 
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decide what national interests are and second, what should guide 
those decision makers in making those calls? 
Richard Nathan: 
Just to make it interesting, I think there is another way to look at 
what Peter was saying. He said that when you look at different 
groups that are target groups for social policy, that it's a matter of 
politics. The groups that are loved the most are going to get 
national attention and national standards. An example that I'm 
particularly going to talk about, where we have been doing a lot of 
research, is welfare. Welfare is different from a cash payment 
system for social security in that now in the 1996 Welfare Act, 
which President Clinton signed, which creates block grants and 
gives more power to the states. The idea of the law is to give people 
different kinds of service assistance to help them get into the labor 
force and stay in the labor force, deal with child care needs, and 
deal with the needs of their family for health care services. You 
could make an argument, Peter, that there is a very logical way of 
thinking about this. If there are criteria, if what you want to do is a 
service function, that has to be lower in terms of the assignment of 
governmental responsibilities. That's not something that national 
government can orchestrate, manage, and implement. So, I think 
there is more to it than just politics. There are strengths in our 
federal system and reasons why we ought to be careful. Not just to 
talk about needs and say, "states are not up to it or the local 
governments will, some of them, do it badly." There are arguments 
I'd like to be sure that are made about diversity-different needs, 
different standards, and different values in a country where 
communities become engaged in meeting certain kinds of needs, 
Peter. I disagree with you. I think there is a way to look at 
allocating functions in our kind of a federal system that involves 
more than just politics. 
Martha Davis: 
I'll surprise myself and add my partial agreement with Dick. I 
wonder to what extent it is valid to rely on historical arguments to 
justify the balance between federal and state power. The 
counterargument is that now we have states which are much more 
capable than they were, even in recent years, with the advent of the 
Internet, etc., to develop bureaucracies to provide services in a way 
that IS III communication with the federal government, 
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communication with other states. Maybe we're in a new era where 
some of the arguments about history no longer apply. When I think 
about what the national interests are, in welfare and civil rights, 
that there is no inherent reason to think that the national and state 
interests would be different. In fact, states and the federal 
government have the same interest in promoting the well-being of 
citizens, and promoting opportunities for people to exercise their 
civil rights. There is no reason that a state would have a different 
interest than the federal government. What the federal government 
has that is different from the state is an interest in continuity and 
consistency across the country, making sure that there is even 
handedness. Also, the federal government may have international 
obligations that states are not so party to. So, the federal 
government may have international accountability that the states 
don't have, that may influence the way the federal government 
would approach civil rights, welfare, and the environment. 
Peter Edelman: 
I always know that I shouldn't leave out something that I have 
made a note to say. In fact, Dick, I take your point, but only up to a 
point. Because when we started thinking about welfare in a way 
that is more work-oriented, which I support if it's done right, the 
subject did acquire some aspects that have to be locally developed. 
So the specifics of a welfare to work system do differ somewhat from 
place to place. I also take your point· that function partly 
determines the appropriate federal-state role. Public education is a 
local responsibility in this country for some very good reasons, 
without getting into the details of where we should have state 
standards and so on. But on welfare, and here's the point where 
maybe we do disagree, I think we went way too far in the 1996 law. 
There should be some national standards about benefit levels, and 
some national protection against arbitrariness and against the 
exceptionally bad policies that we have in some of our states. 
Peter Lehner: 
Let me join for a moment to emphasize that there are two 
elements to this issue. One element is the standards and another is 
the implementation of the standards. The federal environmental 
laws are structured to draw a very big distinction between these 
elements. The federal government sets the standards for clean air 
or clean water, and then leaves it to the state governments to 
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implement air and water policies to achieve them. The federal 
standards have, by and large, been set at relatively stringent levels, 
as Shelley said, with a lot of research going into, for example, 
setting the concentration in parts per million of ozone that is safe to 
breathe. That takes a lot of research. It makes sense for those 
standards to be set by the federal government. Even if there may 
be differences in how people live, the basic human body is the same 
anywhere around the country. But, what has worked less well in 
the federal system is the implementation of those federal standards. 
Thus, in thinking about this, it makes sense to draw a very big 
distinction between standards and implementation of those 
standards. 
There is one other point, relating to the historical view of where 
we're all coming from and how we end up here. I believe the federal 
environmental laws did not primarily come about for the reason 
that Shelley was talking about-because of the pollution crossing 
state boundaries. They came about because states hadn't done the 
jobs and the economic race to the bottom. The water was dirty. 
Rivers were catching on fire. People were choking to death. After 
years and years of the states saying, "no, we can deal with this, 
leave it to us," and resisting federal intrusion into environmental 
policy, the country said, "hey, this isn't working." It really didn't 
have to do with the more analytical explanation of interstate 
pollution. It simply had to do with the fact that the states had been 
unable to control the pollution. 
Don Friedman: 
This is sort of some sniping. When you said that history maybe 
doesn't provide us with guidance. I would say that the change in 
states' capacity to do things wasn't the reason they weren't doing 
them before. What comes to mind the most notably is civil rights, if 
you will. That's a critical point. 
Going back to the overall topic of goals, I just want to point out 
that while it's a worthwhile discussion, I think it's a dangerous area 
because so often goals are misstated by the bodies that are 
announcing those policies, purposely or for some reason misstating 
the goals, or the goals are unstated or implicit. The Welfare Law 
states right up front four goals. One is to help the needy. One is 
get them work, promote families, etc. I would say the closest thing 
the Personal Responsibility law comes to really articulating a goal is 
in the two places in the law where it says nothing in this law should 
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be construed to say that there is an entitlement anymore. That 
comes, for me, to being closer to what the law is really about. 
Another example of misstating or unstated goals is the use of 
block grants. I am now thinking, not so much this law, as right 
before this, when President Reagan started doing it. And a lot of 
the justification for his initiatives had to do with federalism and 
devolution and the lower the level to administer something the 
better they can do it. The better they understand people. What it 
was really about was tax funds. They took a whole bunch of 
programs, they eliminated sixty programs. They combined seventy-
seven programs into nine super block grant programs and cut 
overall funding to that totality by twenty-five percent. That is what 
was really going on there. 
It's a very tough discussion, who should articulate the goals, who 
should set the goals, etc. But there is danger there, when we 
analyze stated goals. 
Erik Olson: 
I would agree. It is exactly the same way in the environmental 
field. We hear quite a bit about getting closer to the state and local 
governments. I would step back and look at the realities of what is 
going to happen. We hear these lofty arguments as to why we need 
to do this, but when we actually see what the implications are and 
what actually happens, I think the bottom line is that the folks that 
are advocating this most vigorously and funding it most vigorously 
are the ones that essentially have captured the agencies at the state 
level, at least in the environmental field. I think that there is just 
enormous industry power at the state and local level. There is a 
potential for brown mail, as it's often called, where the industry can 
say, "Well, if you crack down on us, we're out of this state or out of 
this locality." That kind of problem really cannot be dealt with 
unless there is a major federal presence. So, what I look at is the 
realities. I think the reasons for the lack of political will at many 
state and local levels, and the reasons for efforts to send things back 
down to the state and local levels, often is to deregulate. 
Shelley Metzenbaum: 
I'm going to speak a little bit to your issue about the validity of 
historic analysis. At the end of my comments, which were quite 
theoretical, I said something about states and the different levels of 
government competing with each other to serve the citizenry. My 
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experience in this field has been that so many of these decisions are 
about fixing the problems in these systems. So, for example, in 
welfare, as I understand-where it had evolved, the welfare 
program had primarily become a cash transfer system, as much as 
anything, and people who used to be social service workers were, in 
fact, now simply check writers, even though in many cases their 
training was in social service. They didn't even have the authority 
to do more than that and they were frustrated that they couldn't 
knit their services together to serve their clients better. 
Certainly in the environmental area, eight or nine years ago when 
I first started working at E.P.A., after working at a state level, so 
many of the changes that we tried to make, to give more flexibility 
to the states, were because of the frustration of a lot of innovators at 
the state level. These were folks who were very committed to 
improving environmental quality, and they were frustrated because 
they had to deal with making their programs work on the ground. 
They found their program improvement efforts-designed to 
improve environmental quality-seriously constrained by the little 
boxes Washington had created to manage its grant monies. Now, 
we are probably going to get a reaction again because we're going to 
go too far on the flexibility pendulum, and so people are going to try 
to shove things back in boxes again. And probably for good reason, 
because the flexibility pendulum is moving too far. 
So, I think so much of this federalism debate is a debate driven by 
history and the challenge of implementing the programs. 
Bureaucracies get rigid. So, whether it's the state bureaucracy, the 
local bureaucracy, or the federal bureaucracy, you want to have one 
butt up against the other to make them actually remember why 
they're doing the job they're doing. You want to force them to 
change to be more effective and responsive to the citizens. 
David Markell: 
To wrap up concerning our first issue, the conversation reflects 
that there are many different ways of approaching the question of 
national interests. One of them is looking at politics. Another is 
looking at functions. A third is looking at respective capacities of 
different levels of government to perform certain kinds of services. 
Suffice it to say, at this point, that there is a lively debate about 
what national interests are, how they should be defined, and who 
ought to define them. 
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Let's now move to issue two, which involves the extent to which 
national interests that do exist are being protected through the 
federal system that we are implementing today. This raises Peter 
Lehner's "implementation" issue head on. 
Andrew Cell&:-
Thanks. I'm a practitioner and an enforcement lawyer and I feel 
a little uncomfortable with all this very lofty discussion. But, I 
want to bring my own personal perspective on something a little 
more, for me anyway, practical, and I should start by saying my 
name is Andy Celli and I'm a born-again Federalist. I have 
shunned this for years, but I finally reached middle age and now I 
have welcomed federalism into my life. If my political biography, 
which will never be written, were ever written, there would be a 
new chapter: I would be a liberal, a civil libertarian, a civil rights 
lawyer, and a Federalist. The signs were there all along: in college 
I thought that Jefferson's yeoman farmers were cooler than 
Hamilton's First Bank of the United States. In law school, I 
thought that Brandeis' hypothesis of the states as little laboratories 
was a really intriguing idea. But, I couldn't get past the fact that, 
throughout our history, federalism-and, more specifically, the 
argument that there should be independent sovereign power at the 
state level-that this idea has been used as cover for institutional 
racism, Jim Crow, and segregation. So, I rejected this idea of state 
power, thought it was an anachronism, and I worshiped at the altar 
of federal power. The Supreme Court, the Justice Department, 
particularly the Kennedy Justice Department, the E.E.O.C. These 
were the shrines of my youth. 
But think of where we are at the turn of the millennium. We had 
a democratic president who signed into law some of the most 
punitive welfare legislation in U.S. history. We have a Congress 
that refused to confirm Bill Lann Lee as the Head of the Civil 
Rights Division because he was viewed as too extreme. And I found 
myself rooting for seven elected state judges in a pitched battle with 
the Supreme Court over voting rights in the deep South. So, I don't 
think I've changed; it's the world that's changed. And, there is one 
other small matter that I would like to mention which is that the 
State Attorney General asked me to head up his State Civil Rights 
enforcement office for the State of New York. So, federalism has 
become my personal savior. 
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The question is, is it our national savior in some way? I don't 
know the answer to that, but I can tell you what I saw in 
devolution. I saw that, in the civil rights arena-and this really 
goes to Peter's point about standards-that the playbook and the 
basic rules of the game are, and will continue to be, the historic 
Federal Civil Rights Laws. New York State, and not many people 
know this, has some of the oldest civil rights laws on the books, they 
were passed in the early 1940s. But when we enforce the law 
through the AG.'s office and we look for expansive interpretations, 
we look at the Civil Rights Act of 1877, the Civil Rights Act of '64, 
the Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and more recently the 
AD.A and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. These 
are the fundaments of civil rights enforcement. These are the tools 
that I use in my practical life everyday. And, so these standards, at 
the Federal level, are what we look to. 
I also saw that state enforcement officers, like me and like Peter 
Lehner, with our small and agile offices operating below the 
national political radar, that we can use these federal laws in 
creative and aggressive ways and perhaps in a way that is insulated 
from the kinds of political pressure that, say, the Civil Rights 
Division of the Justice Department faces. For instance, we have a 
continuing case involving predatory lending where we use a very 
old, very unused, law called the Equal Credit Opportunities Act. 
When we described to our adversary our theory under E.C.O.A as 
to why they were liable for targeting Mrican-American and Latino 
borrowers for the worst kind of loans, the guy said to us, ''You guys 
are out on the frontier." Which we took as a great compliment-
especially when, two months later, his client signed an enormous 
consent decree based on our lawsuit in federal court, based on our 
frontier theory. So, I think that state officers can act in ways that 
are beyond or below, maybe, political pressure to do the kind of 
things that the national interests wants us to do, as expressed in 
the federal civil rights laws. 
Finally, the other thing that I saw with devolution was that, 
although state enforcement efforts may appear to lead to a 
patchwork of inconsistent rules-and this point may only apply in 
civil rights and less so in environmental law-I'd like to hear what 
Peter has to say-the need for large corporations, who are usually 
our targets, to standardize their operations and to create rational 
systems for doing business can result in a single state's enforcement 
of changing national behavior patterns. We have seen that in the 
HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1106 2000-2001
1106 Albany Law Review [Vol. 64 
work that we've done in predatory lending and other areas. So, 
that's my perspective on the question. 
David Markell' 
Thanks, Andy. It's fascinating that you and Peter Lehner took 
opposite sides of the same question. Peter said, basically, that 
you've got federal standards and then you've got the 
implementation side, which is where things are lacking in the 
federal system. You seem to be suggesting that you've got federal 
standards and that states can be more nimble and effective in 
actually doing the implementation work. 
Andrew Cellt:· 
What I'm saying is that the idea of federalism and the power at 
the state level is a vehicle for pursuing whatever your ideological 
agenda might be. And if you have an ideological agenda on the left 
and you have basic standards at the federal level, you can do some 
good work. 
Erik Olson: 
I have to agree with you, I think in all the areas we've talked 
about today, you're going to have some states that are out in front, 
in the frontier, trying to push things in favor of the federal 
standards that have been enunciated. But, the question is, what 
altar would you be worshipping at if you were in Mississippi or if 
you were in Louisiana, on an environmental matter? I guess that's 
the question. Just the same way one state can make great law, in 
interpreting federal statutes to advance things, one could argue one 
state can make horrible law to undercut things, if they so choose. I . 
wonder how you would answer that. 
Andrew Cellt:-
Well, I'm glad I'm not from Mississippi, that's the first thing. I 
guess what I would say is that you have to exercise power where it 
exists, and I would come back to the point that it really depends on 
your ideological agenda. The fact of the matter is that there is not 
going to be the kind of enforcement Peter would like in the 
environmental area in Mississippi. 
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You would be surprised at the civil rights enforcement, however, 
in states like Mississippi. Given the choice between nothing at the 
federal level and something at the state level, or at some states' 
levels, I'll pick something. 
Don Friedman: 
It seems that, with regards to civil rights, as inadequate as 
federal activity is now, at least it provides a floor so that in some 
ways the states are only free to do better, as I would define better, 
and not worse. I don't think it worked in the area of welfare, I think 
it's different. Let me just try to shoehorn a few things, anomalies, 
into the question to address this. I was told that you're supposed to 
decide what you're going to say and say it, no matter what you're 
asked. I have the power of the chair! 
I approach this as a welfare advocate and my perspective is 
completely skewed, I would say, by looking at things through the 
warped, perhaps cracked, prism of living and working in New York 
City. And, it really shapes, in a very serious way all of my thinking 
on this issue, in fact, it completely governs my thinking on this 
Issue. 
The other thing I would say is the direct answer to the question, 
to what extent are the national interests protected, if one of the 
national interests is to let homelessness increase, then the national 
interest is being protected by welfare reform. On today's front page 
of the Times, is an article stating that at the height of a ten-year 
economic boom, "homeless shelters in New York filled to highest 
levels since 1980." Some of that may have to do with other things, 
but clearly some of it has to do with the devolution in welfare 
reform. 
We've already discussed about how you would define the national 
interest and the problems there of defining the national interests. I 
won't go through that except to say I'll substitute my own interest 
for what I would like to see the national interest in the area of 
welfare. That everybody who needs it be given a decent income so 
they can survive, we can afford that, and that people should get an 
opportunity to improve their life situation. And, that is clearly not 
the goal that has either been articulated or carried out through 
welfare reform. 
The next question that I thought we need to address concerning 
federalism: is it a salient factor in this world. 
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First, I would say that, as long as society at large and the political 
world at large define the problem of poverty as one of individual 
blame and not structural, having to do with society and economics, 
it doesn't really matter what level of government is in control, we're 
in trouble. Something else is the notion that devolution or 
federalism can give states the opportunities to do good things. It 
made me think that what I might spend most of the rest of my 
introductory time doing, is to discuss an issue commonly raised in 
the welfare context, that is, fraud. 
Welfare advocates generally must address welfare fraud, but I am 
concerned with devolution fraud. Why is it that Congress took 
about 130 pages to write, "we are devolving all the authority of 
governing to the states." Because they were, in fact, setting 
incredibly strict limits on what the states could do. If my idea is 
right, in the civil rights context, the states could only do better. In 
welfare, I believe the states could only do worse, under this setup. 
Let me just list a few of the ways that is true. The states have 
participation rates they are bound by. They have to have a certain 
percentage of adults engaged in work activities. What is work 
activity? Work activity, essentially, very heavily discourages 
involvement in education and training activity, and is very heavily 
skewed and biased towards workfare, where they learn no skills and 
then have no chance of getting a job. Participation rate can be 
reduced by caseload reduction. So, if they are worried about 
suffering financial penalties in a state because they can't meet their 
participation rates, one of the ways they can reduce that 
participation rate is by cutting their caseload. Last year, just to 
give you an example, the legally mandated rate of participation in 
New York was about forty percent; given the caseload reduction 
factor the actual participation rate was eight percent. This was the 
effect of the caseload having been reduced by more than thirty 
percent. So, there is a great incentive to reduce the caseload. 
Another example is the block grant idea, which I already 
discussed, the effect of which might be masked right now because of 
the decline in the rolls, but this is actually a way to cut funding. 
Another way that devolution works is the time limits. As we 
know, under the current welfare law, people can receive federal 
welfare funds for no more than five years. States are free to make 
the period shorter, there is no option to make the period longer, in 
case you feel the person needs more time. There is a little hardship 
protection, but it is not nearly enough. Sanctions. The states must 
punish noncompliance with the rules. There is no leeway on that; 
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the only leeway is either just punish the individual or close the 
whole case. There is no leeway to do other things that might avoid 
punishment. 
Perhaps the most important factor in welfare-the benefit level-
has always been a matter of state choice. That one has been 
devolved forever, and it's why, even before the social experiment of 
devolution happened, every state looked dramatically different in 
the welfare realm, because benefits were dramatically different in 
different states. An historical example from a few years ago, that I 
think is a great example of devolution in action in the welfare area, 
and that is that for many years the federal government had 
something called "quality control." They still do but, under the old 
system of quality control, states could be penalized for overpaying 
people, but would not be penalized for underpaying people. That's 
devolution that only goes one way, in the direction of allowing you 
to punish, or worse. 
Let me just finish by noting that, in a form of devolution just prior 
to welfare reform, states were allowed to get waivers of existing 
welfare -laws to try some experiments. What was the one catch? 
Anything they did had to be cost neutral. That means it couldn't 
cost more than the state was already spending on welfare. Most of 
the things I am in favor for states to experiment with probably cost 
more money. Those things can't be done. 
The last thing I have to say is that perhaps the most important 
devolution has not been the devolution from federal to state, but 
from state to local, and maybe even from local to individual 
caseworker, as well as another form of devolution, from local to 
private, and now increasingly local to faith-based, and we'll see how 
that plays out. I will finish by saying that in New York City, our 
mayor initiated welfare reform long before federal welfare reform 
was adopted. What welfare reform did was it legalized the illegal 
things he was doing .pre-1996, and gave him a license to set a tone 
that said it's okay to conduct welfare policy that simply punishes 
people, and to erect huge barriers so people can't even get into the 
welfare center to apply. So I guess, as you can see, my perspective 
is very dominated by what happened in New York City. Devolution 
has meant licensing complete closing of access for poor people to the 
system. 
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David Markell· 
Peter Lehner IS gomg to talk about the extent to which the 
national interest is being protected in the environmental area. As 
you can tell, the context in the civil rights arena is very different 
from that which exists in the welfare area, in terms of whether the 
federal government establishes a floor that states have to adhere to, 
or whether it frees the states to do whatever they want. 
Peter Lehner: 
It is interesting that the federal/state structure in environmental 
laws sets a federal minimum and gives the states the ability to do 
more. We just painted a picture of a law as having the opposite 
structure. What Andy and I were talking about is that the 
implications of federalism are very often dictated by practical 
concerns. The implementation of laws is usually better at the 
federal level than at the state but, in a few instances, the states are 
more aggressive. So, in a sense, federalism as a theory is value 
neutral. State power could be more or less environmental, more or 
less favorable to civil rights. As a practical matter, it has had a 
fairly anti-environmental history so far. 
It's also interesting to look at what is also happening in current 
Supreme Court cases. At the same time you have Supreme Court 
cases that talk about federalism-cases that I would argue are far 
more just an effort to reduce environmental standards-you also 
have dormant commerce clause cases that are limiting state power. 
When states do try to experiment, industry comes in and says, 
"we've got a global economy, and if you make us do this, it's going to 
be an unfair burden." The Supreme Court, at the same time it is 
limiting federal power, is also limiting state power. So the notion 
that we are limiting federal power in order to enhance the states', is 
not only shown to be somewhat false in the Welfare Reform Act 
context, but is also shown false in other areas of jurisprudence. 
Peter Edelman: 
I think it's important to recognize that we had between the late 
1880s and the late 1930s a no-person's zone. The Supreme Court 
said that there is no federal power under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate, and no state power for substantive due process reasons to 
regulate. So a lot of activity went unregulated until we had the 
"switch in time." We've got the beginnings of the same thing 
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developing again here, and it is very important to notice that and 
for there to a robust public debate about it. We have new Supreme 
Court cases cutting into the federal power under the Commerce 
Clause. We have federal Supreme Court decisions that cut into 
federal power to regulate states because of the Eleventh 
Amendment. And, we have now the Boy Scout case that says there 
is some kind of new constitutional right limiting the state power to 
regulate in the areas of civil rights. So we have a danger that we 
are having a contemporary reincarnation of the no-man's land that 
we had from the 1880s to the 1930s. 
Richard Nathan: 
We could have used historical examples to make the point. We 
have to remember that in that same period, the 1920s, the federal 
government did not act in many areas. It was the progressive 
initiatives of states for unemployment insurance, child welfare, or 
retirement systems. It was Wisconsin, New York, and Minnesota. 
The state role could be different, and the activist energies that you 
would like to see advanced, along with the ideas that you would like 
to see advanced, may not come from Washington in conservative 
periods, indeed like the one we are in. We could have a long 
discussion about welfare, which you would need a whole two-hour 
session to get deeply into. But, it never was just a matter of 
implementation. AFDC was always as long as you wanted to make 
it. The fact of the matter is, that AFDC benefits have risen, because 
states have raised the monetary benefits to encourage new 
recipients to stay in the labor force. It has risen more under this 
new law throughout the country, than in the previous period, when 
we had a national law which wasn't very good either, by your 
standards. There isn't a reason for always saying "let's do it in 
Washington, because then I can do it better." In fact, in different 
periods of our history, things that we wanted to do, activists in 
government, being upfront and helping people and leading the way 
in a good cause-it hasn't always come from Washington. The same 
voters vote for the people that represent us here in this state capitol 
that vote for the people that we just got elected in Washington. 
Martha .Davis: 
One more point on the question of civil rights floor. I think one of 
the reasons that we included civil rights in this conversation is the 
feeling that because of u.s. v. Morrison and because of the Eleventh 
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Amendment cases, that the federal floor is starting to develop holes. 
A good example of the anomalies that have been created is the Age 
Discrimination Act case-the Kimel case-where now state 
employees can no longer invoke federal protections of the Age 
Discrimination Act if they are discriminated against by a state 
employer. Andy, you can tell me-how have states have responded 
to that? Have they said, "Great! Now we can set whatever 
standards we want." Or, have they said, "Oh, gosh, we feel 
terrible-this group of employees is not being protected in 
accordance with the way every other employee is, and so therefore 
we are going to enact statutes that give them that protection," in 
acknowledgment of the apparent national interest articulated in the 
Age Discrimination Act. 
Andrew Geltz:-
I think they said, "Great!" I think Peter Lehner was being a little 
too kind when he said federalism is content neutral. I spoke to a 
friend of mine who argued the Dale case-the Boy Scout case-in 
the Supreme Court, and he said that he thought the most important 
part of the argument when he got up there were the first five words 
that he said, which were "The State of New Jersey." Of course, they 
love states up there, right? And, of course, he lost. And, then we 
have Bush v. Gore, where suddenly we have the majority of the 
court extolling the virtues of the Equal Protection Clause over state 
power. So, let's not kid ourselves about what's really going on here. 
Peter Edelman: 
I want to say Dick, there is a theme here that looks like a 
difference, but that particular difference is not there. There are 
many areas where we want to encourage states to be experimental 
and creative. But, the history I was citing was that the Supreme 
Court squelched the states and wouldn't let them innovate. Part of 
the change in the Roosevelt Court was to support the ability of the 
states to experiment. Similarly, some of the more successful areas 
of civil rights and the environment are as a cooperative federalism 
where you have the baseline national floor and the capacity of 
states to do more, which accords with what you've said about 
creative state action. What I am concerned about in the welfare 
area is that we lack a baseline to keep the states from doing really 
bad things, while still allowing them to do the good things that 
some states are doing. 
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.David Markell: 
Fair enough. That's actually a perfect transition to the third 
topic. The third topic is to look at, in particular, the kinds of 
policies that have been effective in the federal system in achieving 
national interests, essentially, the question of what works. Dick, if 
you could turn your attention to that. 
Richard Nathan: 
I don't want to engage in the kind of deep contemplation of 
policies in a particular functional area that some of us know a lot 
about, and that we differ on, or interpret in a different way. What 
we want to think about is what are the benefits of federalism. And, 
one benefit of federalism is that we can allow for diversity, for 
experimentation, for communities with different values and 
different needs, to have their community deal with things in ways 
that suit them. Federalism can be a way of reconciling unity and 
diversity. It permits experimentation. It gives citizens more ways 
in which they can identify with the community, communities doing 
things to be what are regarded as public needs. 
So, I think that we want to try to put at the top of this discussion 
whether we want this balance to shift. One of the most interesting 
things in my experience is to watch how the courts have interpreted 
the welfare clause in the Constitution. Now the current court, in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's famous decision, the Garcia decision, 
where the court went five to four in favor of a federal rule in the 
particular area. His one-liner was, "We'll get you next time." These 
are not intrinsic matters of right and wrong, morally or even in 
operational terms of who can do something necessarily. 
But, I wanted to pause on that just for a minute and use what 
may be another thirty seconds of my time to say that I think you 
should have chosen education for this topic today. Because we are 
about to enter into a great debate where the President says, "Well, I 
believe in states. We are Republicans." What we want to have is 
tests at every grade level. Now, what kind of tests are going to 
satisfy that federal requirement? Who is going to say what those 
tests are? It is going to be an interesting debate that really hasn't 
been firmed up. Seven percent of the total spending for public 
elementary and secondary education in the country is federal, so 
ninety-three percent of what we spend for education is state and 
local. 
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Do Americans want to make the argument that there are certain 
kinds of things that you can't do from the center as well as you can 
do them in the community, in ways that reflect what different 
people need and want in their lives, and what the conditions are in 
the community. There are attributes of this reconciling unity and 
diversity that involve diversity as being advantageous for certain 
kinds of things that you chose not to standardize, or formulaize, or 
oversee from a national government. If what you care about now is 
that people are needy we should help them work, that's a very 
complicated idea. It involves all kinds of things that some 
governments are doing much better than they used to do before. If 
what you want to do is help families make it, and families are very 
complicated things, having very different conditions with all kinds 
of health, mental health, child abuse, family violence, child care, 
transportation, education needs. You need to think about where 
that kind of relationship can take into account, not just the 
diversity of the country but the diversity of human needs for 
families with children. This is constantly shifting balance. Pretty 
soon all my liberal friends may hate national government. And, 
maybe that's a good thing. Maybe this equilibrating, Brandeis 
called ours great laboratories of federalism, maybe this 
equilibrating capability which the founders put into that great 
document is a benefit to society. But I hope that we can stay at a 
high note plane, David, to think about principles of government and 
not to worry just about where certain issues stand today . 
.David Markell' 
One of the questions in terms of what systems or policies have 
been effective is actually to look at some of the implementation 
issues that Peter Lehner alluded to before. What have states been 
doing to experiment, to try to make things better. Andy alluded to 
it before, as well. And, where have some of the experiments, the 
laboratories of democracy, paid dividends? Peter, can you talk a 
little bit about that? 
Peter Lehner: 
If I can, just two comments on what was said. First, you were 
talking about the President's proposals for education-that there 
should be tests but it is up to the states to decide what the tests are. 
Although it strikes me as a facially absurd notion, the E.P.A. just 
promulgated a rule that says that pesticide applicators should be 
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tested, but that E.P.A. will leave it up to the states to say what the 
tests are and, thus, when one can apply poisons in an acceptable 
manner. So the President wasn't the first to come up with this idea. 
He was just punting, with a token nod toward the federal role and 
then leaving it to the states. 
Second, I would say that you are right that it would be great to 
have a conversation where we could discuss federalism as a 
principle. But I would argue that, as it is evolving over the last 
twenty years, federalism is largely unprincipled. It is not an effort 
to provide more power to the states, because if that were the case, 
then you wouldn't have these Commerce Clause cases eviscerating 
the ability of states to have more aggressive environmental 
regulation. One area in which we see this clearly is the area of 
actual enforcement. We often view federalism as a zero-sum game: 
there is a certain amount of power to be exercised and it is either 
the feds or the states who will exercise it, but it is not both; cut back 
the feds, and the assumption is that somehow the states will fill in 
that role. If you look at actual enforcement, though, that's not the 
case. The federal environmental laws are structured so that most 
enforcement is left to the states. The federal government sets the 
standards and designs what a program should look like, and then, 
in almost all cases, delegates that program to the state governments 
to implement. The state governments issue the actual permits 
under federal guidance. They are the ones who send out the 
inspectors. They are the ones who bring enforcement actions in the 
first instance. But, the federal government is supposed to have an 
oversight role. They are supposed to be there, so if the states don't 
enforce, the federal government can directly enforce. A sort of 
gorilla in the closet. However, what is happening in the last few 
years, especially, is that when the federal government does try to 
enforce, it gets clobbered. E.P.A. is told that its enforcement budget 
is going to get cut, or whatever else. So the federal government is 
now more wary to enforce. The result of that, though, is that there 
has been less state enforcement. Without the gorilla in the closet, 
the states are saying, "hey, I don't have to enforce." They will 
welcome anyone they want with open arms, anyone who wants to 
pollute. The result has not been that less federal power means 
more state power, but just the opposite-less federal involvement, 
when it comes to actual implementation, means less state 
involvement. So, when you look at it from that point of view, it's a 
very different vision of federalism than this either-the-states-or-the-
feds vision. 
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Now, going back to what has worked and what hasn't. As I 
mentioned, there is a general consensus that the federal 
government has done a moderately good job in the environmental 
area in setting standards that are relatively protective of human 
health and the environment. And, some states have done a 
relatively good job of enforcing those, but the majority of the states 
have been relatively slack. The Clean Air Act, when in was passed 
in 1970, expected there would be clean air-air safe to breathe-by 
1977. We still have over 100,000,000 Americans breathing air that 
the federal government says isn't safe enough to breathe. The 
Clean Water Act, passed in 1972, expected that we wouldn't need 
this whole permitting structure because there wouldn't be any more 
discharges of pollutants by 1985. Waters would fishable and 
swimmable by 1985. Well, the most recent survey shows that about 
one-third of our waters aren't close to being fishable and 
swimmable, and those are only the waters that we have actually 
looked at. So, something clearly has gone wrong and it's largely 
state implementation. 
But it's interesting to ask the question, "what has gone right?" 
One of the things that has made an extraordinary difference is that 
all the federal environmental statutes, except for one, provide for 
citizen suits. They allow the individual who is harmed to bring a 
suit, not against the government, but against the polluter directly. 
Virtually no state allows any citizen suits. New York has a few very 
specific citizen suit provisions. We did a survey a few years ago and 
found that, by and large, no state has any effective citizen suit 
provision in the environmental arena. The fact that federal citizens 
suits are out there scares the regulated community to an 
extraordinary degree. You can capture an agency, as somebody 
talked about, but you can't capture the environmentalists or 
community groups. That forces polluters to think that they should 
comply because they can't be guaranteed that they won't be 
enforced against. 
Another thing that the federal environmental laws have done 
quite well is to require a fair amount, not enough in most 
circumstances, but a fair amount, of reporting and to require that 
all those reports be publicly available. Implementation has not 
always been perfect, but there is quite a bit of information about 
pollution that you get from a database. Sometimes you have to go 
to local or state agency offices to get some files. Now you can get a 
lot on the web. This information provides citizens with an 
extraordinary tool to raise the profile of an issue in their local 
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community if nothing else. There is a debate going on now about 
electronic filing of pollution reports. Many companies originally 
advocated that because it would be a lot easier. Then they realized, 
"Oh, my goodness. If I electronically file, boom, it's up on a web 
page. It's not lost in some office down in New Paltz or someplace, 
and that means that anybody can find it." So now the general 
position of the reporting industries is that they do not want 
electronic filing anymore. It's an interesting statement on the 
power of information. But it also shows another program that has 
worked in the federal environmental laws. 
Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Act requires 
agencies to, in essence, look before they leap. It tells the federal 
government to think about the environmental consequences before 
it undertakes an action. Many states have passed similar laws 
requiring state and local governments to consider environmental 
consequences before they take an action. And again, there are a lot 
of questions of how well they've worked. But what they have 
definitely done is given citizens the opportunity to say "you haven't 
thought about this enough." And they have offered to citizens 
litigation options to change that situation. Through litigation, a 
citizen has an opportunity, instead of being powerless, to actually 
enter into the debate and, if nothing else, delay a project for a 
couple of years and, therefore, have some bargaining power. 
So, interestingly, the common theme of all of the programs that 
have worked is not devolution from the federal government to the 
states, but from the federal government directly to individuals; how 
they empowered individuals in a way that states have never been 
willing to do. That is a pretty telling statement of how federalism is 
working. 
Another side of this issue is to ask what has worked for state 
governments. Is carrying out federal mandates where they've done 
a good job? Is it through the implementation of federal programs? 
Sometimes. But in some ways, at least in the environmental arena, 
we've been able to be most creative and most aggressive going back 
to good old-fashioned common law, something that predates the 
federal structure. We just today, by the way, had a great seven-zip 
decision in the Court of Appeals affirming the public trust 
doctrine-that certain land is held in trust by the public and that 
local governments can't use it for non-park purposes without going 
to the state legislature. This doctrine goes back to Roman times. 
So, in some ways, where the states have been most effective has not 
been in what the federal government has given them, but in 
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common law and the public trust provisions of law that long predate 
our federal structure. That again, is a telling commentary on 
federalism. 
I would offer one last thought on why it is that state governments 
have by and large not taken the opportunities given to them by the 
federal laws and done better. I would offer two words on that, 
which are "campaign finance." 
Andrew Celll> 
Just a very quick point. I mean, your point about devolution for 
individuals applies equally, if not more so, in the civil rights arena. 
The impact of fee-shifting, requiring defendants to pay winning 
plaintiffs in civil rights cases on enforcement, on private 
enforcement efforts, is enormous. There would be no private civil 
rights enforcement-my former law firm would be dust-if it were 
not for fee shifting. That's an example of federal government 
priorities being enforced by individual citizens, and I think that is a 
great model. 
Shelley Metzenbaum: 
I just want to try to extract two lessons I'm hearing about things 
that are working. What works in terms of the national role. I'm 
talking about the national government, instead of the federal, 
because I think that the federalist government is both the state and 
national government. Peter, when you talk about laws that work 
(by the way, I think your comment about the need for national 
standards in the education system is right on point), I think we've 
got two lessons from the' environmental area. 
One is the Clean Air Act, where there are very clear national 
standards, what I'll call a floor of decency where the federal 
government, the national government, sets up minimum standards 
for air quality. That's in contrast to the Clean Water Act where the 
states are supposed to set the standards. In fact, they have not 
done it, in most cases. So, under the Clean Air Act, you have this 
floor of national decency, you also have required measurement of 
states meeting that floor, and you have sanctions if they're not 
making that floor of decency. It's a law that's working pretty darn 
well. 
There is a provision of another law which is called the Toxic 
Release Inventory, and it requires companies to report in a 
standard method the quantity of toxics they release to the 
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environment. Now, there are problems with TRI, but it's better 
than what existed before. Companies have to report TRI 
information in the same way across the country, more or less. Just 
by putting that information out to the public, we have begun to see 
real reductions in corporate release of toxics to the environment. 
I think these two examples teach us a lesson on the education 
debate, which is coming up, which is, we probably want a national 
floor of decency regarding education, for each of our kids. But, this 
notion of the state setting up their own tests, is going to be like the 
Clean Water Act, where state standards, if established, are not very 
informative because they cannot be compared across states. 
Peter Lehner: 




Are not clean. Don't meet the standards that the states have set 
for them. 
Shelley Metzenbaum: 
But only thirty percent of the waters are even monitored. If that. 
It's like fourteen percent in some kinds of water bodies. So, we don't 
even know if state programs are working or not because no one is 
measuring the water quality. When I ~ear people talk about the 
laboratories of democracy, I keep coming back to this measurement 
issue and the need for the federal government to really force 
standardized, credible, and comparable measurement of these 
outcomes that we care about. That will let us see how far we are 
relative to the floor of decency. But also, if we're going to have these 
laboratories, you can't have them if there are no scientists in the 
laboratory evaluating the experiments and if they're all using 
different kinds of instruments to evaluate it with. You've got to 
have some comparable metrics. 
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Don Friedman: 
Richard Nathan invited us to rise and be principled in this 
discussion and I decline that invitation. I just spent two days 
lobbying the legislature, so how could I possibly do that? I do want 
to ask, in the welfare context, what has been the impact of welfare 
reform and its devolution? What has been happening? You did 
mention a few good things that have been done, and I would agree, 
by some states. But overall, we may not agree with this 
assessment, but we have some information about what's happening. 
First of all, we probably all know the welfare rolls have gone 
down dramatically. From as much as ninety percent declines to I 
don't think any states lost less than fifty percent of its welfare 
population. So, around the country, there has been a huge decline 
in welfare rolls. Many people would define that, in fact, I believe 
that's a defining fact of welfare reform success. What's happened to 
the people who are leaving the rolls? Many of them are working. A 
very large percentage of them who are working are doing as poorly 
or worse than they were doing when they were on welfare. They 
have some increased costs and they're not matched by their 
earnings, they tend to be low wage, temporary, no benefit jobs, 
without any chance for advancement. Many people who were 
working and left the rolls are back on the rolls. That has always 
been true that there is a lot of cycling on and off. Many of those 
who are off the rolls are not working. One of the most important 
reasons why people are off the rolls is because they were sanctioned 
off the rolls. Sanction is the punishment of people on welfare who 
have not complied with the rules and, as I would submit, is the 
driving force of all of the welfare activity. Actually, one research 
piece that I read recently said that in a three month period, forty 
percent of the caseload decline in the nation was explainable by 
sanctions. Not jobs, but sanctions. Because of the strong economy 
there has been some reduction in poverty. I say because of the 
economy because I don't think that welfare reform has anything to 
do with the decline in poverty. Something I do think is attributable 
to welfare reform is that to the extent that people are poor, there is 
deeper poverty. The number of people who are deep in poverty has 
been increasing in these boom times. 
But, the last thing I just want to say that gets a little more 
directly to the federalism discussion is that a number of states have 
done interesting things. Let me use Wisconsin rather than 
generalize. We'll use one state. They did interesting things after 
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they cut eighty percent of their case load. If you weight the good 
things, some more money for child care, some more money for 
education and training, against the bad, namely an eighty percent 
reduction in caseload, it's a mismatch. The damage has been done. 
Richard Nathan: 
I'm not here to argue about welfare, but what they've done in 
Wisconsin has served people who are working. They've spent more 
money than they've ever spent before, for more services to help 
working families. You can't just talk about the cash assistance 
caseload decline and be telling enough. I'm not saying you're wrong, 
but I don't think we should just talk about one person's view of 
welfare reform in Wisconsin. 
David Markell' 
To sum up in terms of this issue, notably what systems and 
policies have been effective, I think you can, as Shelley was saying, 
glean a few general principles from the discussion. One of them is 
that, at least in a couple of the contexts, there is a federal floor that 
seems to have motivated the states to a certain level of 
performance. Thus, there is the suggestion that a federal floor is 
valuable in promoting enhanced performance. 
The second issue is the issue of sanctions. Andy remarked before 
that one of the things New York has done that is positive is to use 
federal authority in ways that sometimes the feds themselves 
haven't used. The idea is that the creation, and existence, of federal 
authority, regardless of who is exercising that authority, is a way in 
which the federal system has been constructive and productive. 
The third issue is one that Peter Lehner focused on, empowering 
citizens. Whether that is part of federalism, per se, or just part of 
the federal infrastructure, is something that you can discuss, but 
clearly it's an inherent part of the environmental laws. The 
environmental laws empower citizens in a wide variety of ways, 
ranging from bringing a suit themselves, to getting information so 
they can vocalize and interact with regulated parties who are 
engaging in pollution. Peter suggests that this is a third feature of 
having a federal system that is paying dividends. 
A fourth feature of the federal system that I'll close with hasn't 
been mentioned here today but I don't think it should be ignored, is 
the issue of capacity. The states in recent years have done an 
enormous amount to increase capacity on their own to engage in 
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environmental protection and other activities. Many would say that 
the federal government has played an instrumental role in 
enhancing state capacity and giving the states the tools they need to 
regulate and to engage in efforts to promote environmental 
protection. So, these are four features of our federal system that 
seem to have provided dividends in the view of one or more of our 
panelists. 
With that brief summary, let's turn to our fourth topic, the 
obstacles to achieving an appropriate state federal balance and how 
those can be overcome. I'll start with Erik. 
Erik Olson: 
I do think that there are three areas where the system has clearly 
worked. One is the devolution to individuals, as Peter was saying, 
in the situation of civil rights. And, also certainly in the 
environmental area that I'm familiar with. In that area there is a 
direct federal standard and there are the individual citizens. Who 
is closer to the people than the people themselves? Where you have 
that situation, we actually have had some success. In California 
they have succeeded at the state level with Proposition 65. 
Proposition 65 was adopted, over the objection of virtually the entire 
industrial complex in California, by the citizens. Now, citizens can 
directly sue to enforce environmental standards. That's the only 
strong citizen suit supervision that I know of in state law that was 
basically and essentially adopted by citizens over the objection of 
the state government as well as industry. 
The second area that has been successful is where the federal 
government can act unilaterally. I will offer a couple of examples, 
such as lead phase-out in gasoline, which is documented to have 
enormous impact in blood lead levels across the country, and the 
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons, which has clearly had significant 
environmental benefit. That is where there didn't have to be a 
federalist argument. 
The third area, and this is a little more murky, is where there 
was a clear federal floor and clear sanctions for not meeting that at 
the state level that were essentially self-executing. That is 
relatively rare in environmental law, but there are a few examples, 
that I won't go into, where this actually worked. And, usually they 
are where funding is automatically withdrawn and it's too bad if the 
state doesn't adopt it. There isn't any discretion there. So, those 
are a few bright lights that I think are worth highlighting. 
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I was asked to talk about obstacles, and I think there are a lot of 
them, and we've heard many of them touched upon. I'd like to do a 
parade of horribles for some of the obstacles, and since I was just 
Pollyanna and talked about all the successes, I do think that some 
of the obstacles are more significant than others. I would say that 
perhaps that the number one obstacle in the federalist debate right 
now is the Supreme Court of the United States. I think that where 
we are headed right now, there are several recent court decisions 
under the Tenth Amendment, under the Eleventh Amendment, and 
in interpreting the Commerce Clause, that are taking us in the 
direction that I think is close to where we were in the time of 
Lochner and Schechter Poultry. That is, close to the time when, 
essentially, the federal government, for reasons that I view were 
largely unprincipled, will be prohibited from moving into certain 
areas of regulation, and the real reasons are that there are very 
powerful interests in campaign finance. That's one area. 
I would say my proof in the pudding of why this is unprincipled, is 
every time I go up to Capitol Hill and I have these debates about 
federalist issues, on one hand I hear how it is so important to 
delegate and send things back to the states. However, when an 
industry comes in and wants federal preemption, well, suddenly 
that's not very important. It's very clear. 
The other proof in the pudding is that now at least nineteen 
states have adopted "no-more-stringent-than" clauses in the 
environmental area. What does that mean? That means that the 
state legislature, and I wonder who asked the state legislature to do 
this, the state legislature says we can be no more stringent than the 
least stringent federal rule. This is true in nineteen states now, but 
it's not necessarily across the board in each state. That tells me 
that the race to the bottom is quite real. That many states go as far 
down to the bottom as they possibly can, and if you removed the 
federal requirements, they would go all the way down to the bottom. 
At least some states would. The reason for that, I think frankly, is 
the campaign finance issue, political power, and realities. 
That brings me to the underlying basic problem, which is the 
power of money in the United States in the twenty-first century. I 
think we all know it, but that's really the bottom line for a lot of 
these problems. For the environmental problem and many others. 
I'd like to talk about lofty principles, but I think that the bottom 
line in many of these debates is, who has the money. The person 
with the money is the one that controls the agenda and it is much 
more difficult to overcome where it is invisible at the state level 
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very often. Of course, it's very difficult to overcome, even at the 
federal level. 
At the state level, several identifiable obstacles are important. 
There is the lack of funding staff and expertise at many states. 
Very often, even if they have the political will, which is another 
huge obstacle, the states simply cannot take on a major industry. 
The industry can throw enormous resources and essentially wear 
the state down to the point where a twenty-four year old kid 
straight out of school who is tasked with fighting the thirty industry 
lawyers simply cannot muster the attention and will to take them 
on. The imbalance between power and between technical and 
scientific expertise and resources is so enormous that it's a real 
impediment to really delegating things very often at the state level. 
Which is not to say that it doesn't happen at the federal level. It 
certainly does. 
Another significant issue, and frankly this is one of real concern, 
is that at the state and local government level, very often there is no 
public interest community. There is no watch dog. If there is a 
watch dog, they're watching the entire state agency and they simply 
don't have the expertise or ability to even know what's going on, 
much less try to advocate. They don't have the resources, and they 
don't have the expertise, and it makes it, essentially, a sham to say 
that this is being delegated down to the state or local level, because 
there isn't anybody to watch what's going on. 
There is also a very significant problem of lack of public 
disclosure and a lack of transparency at the state level. One 
question in the written material is: would transparency help? Yes, 
it would help. It's not going to solve the problem, if you've got a 
huge industry that can overwhelm the resources of a small 
community group. Having the permit available to the citizen-group 
to read, it doesn't really help them very much or enable them to 
understand how much Chromium IV is in their drinking water, it 
may not help them very much if they don't know what Chromium 
IV is. 
The last significant impediment I wanted to mention is that, I 
think the gorilla in the closet is being locked in the closet. The 
solution that we often hear is, "Well, we need this federal gorilla in 
the closet who can beat his chest and say, 'Well the state doesn't do 
their job and then the federal government is going to come in and 
step in to make sure that the state does.''' Well, that gorilla is 
increasingly being locked into the closet and can't come out and, 
therefore, as Peter just suggested, there isn't really the pressure for 
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the states to go forward, so we have overall less enforcement effort, 
less implementation effort, and with the Supreme Court decisions I 
think that's only going to get worse. 
Richard Nathan: 
I'm trying to figure out about what we're talking about. The 
comments you just made are supposed to be on federalism, but what 
I hear you saying is that federalism, to you, means national control. 
Could we do a balance sheet about a system that shares power 
versus a system that doesn't share power? Ours is a system of 
shared powers, that's how you should think about and assess 
American federalism. That's really what we should be discussing. 
There are pro factors for sharing power. Some states can 
innovate and lead. We have diversity. You can decide you want to 
strengthen community as a political value. In some areas you can 
decide you want to enhance competition if states are trying to do 
certain things that we would like them to compete to do better than 
other states. What is the down side of sharing power? It seems to 
me that's what the discussion ought to be, "What is the up side and 
what's the down side of the kind of very subtle sharing of power 
that we have in our political system?" And, I hear most of you 
saying here that what federalism means to you is just, "Please have 
more national power," which I don't think is all you should talk 
about when you have a seminar on federalism. 
On the other side of the ledger, I would put that the argument for 
national power, which is most of what I have heard here, is that you 
get uniformity. You can reduce the cost and effects of externalities. 
You can, and this is what we have been seeing a lot, make it easier 
for business to compete in the global economy. You can achieve 
purposes that involve equal treatment across state boundaries of 
citizens. (Equal bad and equal good, by the way). 
What I think the audience should go away from this thinking, is 
that there are arguments for and against sharing power. This is a 
key point. Federalism is not necessarily a bad thing. Read the 
Constitution. Read the Federalist Papers about divided 
responsibility and shared sovereignty. Shared in different ways. 
It's very complicated. There are three ways that governments carry 
out functions. They set standards, they pay for achieving them, and 
they administer programs. Our sharing of power involves very 
complicated mixtures of those three things for different functions. 
Do you want to share power, or do you not, should be the federalism 
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question that you should ponder when Professor David Markell 
finishes moderating this forum. 
David Markell: 
Thanks, Dick. What I think we should do, because we are 
running out of time, is give Peter a chance for a thirty second 
comment, and then I'm going to invite questions and comments 
from the audience. 
Peter Lehner: 
In response to what you were saying, it's important to distinguish 
between federalism as a theory and federalism as a matter of 
reality. I would argue, and as I said earlier, federalism in theory is 
value neutral. State powers could be better if campaign finance 
realities were different and, in fact, states were more responsive to 
individual concerns than other levels of government. Then 
federalism would be a terrific tool for more civil rights, more 
environmental protection. Given our poor campaign finance system 
at all levels of government, however, it's arguably the federal 
government that, in a weird way, is actually more responsive to 
most people than are the state governments. You have to look at 
federalism, or at least those of us who are living it look at it, as a 
matter of reality. I would love to think of it as divorced from 
campaign finance and the reality of how responsive state 
governments are. 
[Question & Answer Session Omitted] 
David Markell: 
This has been a very interesting discussion. We've had a very 
active group of participants. Martha and I very much appreciate 
your active engagement and your vigorous participation. And we 
truly appreciate your venturing forth to Albany in February, the 
day after a significant snow storm, to join us. For the audience, and 
the participants, we have raised a lot of issues today. The purpose 
of this conversation is to help to facilitate other conversations about 
these very important principles. Again, four of the questions to 
consider are the ones we outlined at the outset: 1) what are the 
national interests at stake; 2) to what extent are they being 
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effectively achieved; 3) what are some of the successes that we have 
realized, how do we emulate those, and how can we communicate 
them better; and 4) where have things gone awry, and how can we 
learn from these experiences. The participants offered some very 
insightful comments on each issue that we hope will inform your 
thinking. 
Participant Biographies: 
Andrew G. Cellt: Jr. 
Andrew G. Celli, Jr. is Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau in the 
Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. The Civil 
Rights Bureau conducts affirmative litigation, investigations, and 
policy initiatives in the areas of reproductive rights, disability 
rights, police misconduct, and discrimination in employment, 
mortgage lending, housing, public accommodations, and other 
sectors. The Bureau employs an "impact litigation" model to court 
cases, drafts and proposes civil' rights-related legislation for 
consideration by the State Legislature, releases reports, and 
facilitates educational seminars on civil rights controversies around 
the state. Finally, the Bureau assists the New York State Solicitor 
General in the preparation and submission of amicus briefs in civil 
rights cases of interest to the State. The Bureau is comprised of 
twelve lawyers and includes a Reproductive Rights Unit and a 
Disability Rights Project. As chief, Mr. Celli is responsible for 
selecting cases, formulation of litigation strategy, and overall 
supervision of the Bureau's docket. 
Before joining the Attorney General's Office, Mr. Celli was a 
partner in the firm of Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP 
(1996-1999; previously Richard D. Emery, PC, 1993-1996), a firm 
that specializes in plaintiffs civil rights, police misconduct, First 
Amendment, and related matters. Prior to that, Mr. Celli was an 
associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore (1991-1993), and a law clerk 
to Hon. Charles P. Sifton, U.S. District Judge (E.D.N.Y.) (1990-
1991). Mr. Celli is a 1990 cum laude graduate of the New York 
University School of Law, where he was a member of the Law 
Review and a Libel Law Fellow. 
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Martha F. Davis 
Martha Davis is Vice President and Legal Director of NOW Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, an independent public interest legal 
and advocacy organization. As legal director, Ms. Davis oversees 
NOW Legal Defense litigation and advocacy in the areas of 
economic justice, violence against women, education, reproductive 
rights, and employment. Her Supreme Court litigation has 
included u.s. v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11740 (2000), which addressed 
federalism issues, and Nguyen v. INS, which she argued before the 
Court in January of this year. The focus of Ms. Davis' work has 
been economic justice, and she writes and speaks frequently on the 
legal rights of poor women. Ms. Davis is the author of the 
prizewinning book Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Wellare Rights 
Movement, as well as an adjunct professor at the New York 
University School of Law. In 1998, she was named a Wasserstein 
Fellow at Harvard Law School in recognition of her public interest 
work, and in the fall of 2000 she served as the inaugural Kate 
Stoneman Visiting Professor of Law and Democracy at Albany Law 
School. Ms. Davis holds a B.A. from Harvard University, an M.A. 
(Oxon.) from Oxford University, and a J.D. from the University of 
Chicago. 
Peter Edelman 
Peter Edelman is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University 
Law Center where he has been on the faculty since 1982. He took 
leave from 1993 to 1996 to serve in the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, first as Counselor to Donna Shalala and then 
as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Professor 
Edelman was Associate Dean of the Law Center in the late 1980s, 
Director of the New York State Division for Youth in the late 1970s, 
and Vice President of the University of Massachusetts before that. 
He was a Legislative Assistant to Senator Robert F. Kennedy from 
1965 to 1968 and was Issues Director for Senator Edward 
Kennedy's Presidential campaign in 1980. He served as Law Clerk 
to Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in 1962-63 and before 
that to Judge Henry J. Friendly on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, and was Special Assistant to Assistant Attorney 
General John Douglas in the U.S. Department of Justice following 
his Supreme Court clerkship. 
Professor Edelman's book, Searching lor Americas Heart,- RFK 
and the Renewal 01 Hope, was published by Houghton-Mifflin in 
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January 2001. He is the author of many articles on poverty, 
constitutional law, and issues relating to children and youth. His 
article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled, "The Worst Thing Bill 
Clinton Has Done" received the Harry Chapin Media Award. 
Professor Edelman grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
attended Harvard College and Harvard Law School. 
.Don Friedman 
Don Friedman is a Senior Policy analyst with the Community 
Food Resource Center, a non-profit organization that addresses 
food, hunger, nutrition, and income issues in New York City. In 
that capacity, he focuses particularly on welfare and welfare reform 
issues, engaging in advocacy, education, and advice concerning 
public assistance issues. Before joining CFRC, Friedman worked 
for 21 years as a staff attorney and then as a government benefits 
specialist with Legal Services for New York City. He also teaches in 
the Urban Studies Department at Queens College. Friedman 
obtained his RA. from the University of Michigan, and his J.D. 
from Harvard Law School. 
Peter Lehner 
Peter Lehner is currently the Chief of the Environmental 
Protection Bureau in the New York Attorney General's office. The 
Bureau both enforces state and federal environmental laws and 
defends state agencies when sued on environmental matters. 
Lehner worked previously for five years at the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, where he was senior attorney and director of the 
Clean Water Project. From 1985-1994, Peter worked with the New 
York City Law Department, first in the Affirmative Litigation 
Division and later as Deputy Chief of the Environmental Law 
Division. He also teaches environmental law at Columbia Law 
School. Lehner obtained his J.D. from Columbia Law School in 
1984, and his RA. from Harvard College. He clerked for Chief 
Judge James Browning of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit . 
.David L. Markell 
Professor David L. Markell joined the Albany Law School faculty 
in 1992. He teaches a series of environmental law and other 
courses at the Law School. Professor Markell is the author of 
HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1130 2000-2001
1130 Albany Law Review [Vol. 64 
numerous publications on environmental law and related topics. 
One book co-authored by Professor Markell received the Award for 
Scholarship from the American Bar Association Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice and was designated 
the "most outstanding work of legal scholarship in the field" 
published in 1995. Professor Markell has been actively involved in 
environmental issues at the international, national (U.S.), state, 
and local levels while a member of the Albany Law School faculty. 
He has testified numerous times before the U.S. Congress and the 
New York State Legislature. He also has served on several work 
group and other advisory bodies. Professor Markell serves as a 
member of the New York State Bar Association Environmental Law 
Section's Committee, and in 1997 received its Certificate of 
Achievement award. Professor Markell took a leave of absence from 
the Law School between August 198 and June 2000 to serve as 
Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters, for the North 
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 
Prior to joining the Albany Law School faculty in 1992, Professor 
Markell served as Director of the Division of Environmental 
Enforcement for the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC). He also has served as an attorney with the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency and as a Trial 
Attorney with the United States Department of Justice's 
Environmental Enforcement Section. Professor Markell is a 1975 
magna cum laude graduate of Brandeis University and a 1979 
graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law. 
Shelley H Metzenbaum 
Shelley H. Metzenbaum is a Visiting Professor at the University 
of Maryland's School of Public Mfairs, where she leads the 
Environmental Compliance Consortium, a project that brings state 
environmental protection agencies together to develop better ways 
to measure and manage state environmental compliance and 
enforcement programs. She also serves as Director of the 
Performance Management Project at the Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, a project that convened public 
and private leaders from the federal, state, and local level to 
identify ways to make public sector performance measurement more 
useful. Professor Metzenbaum is the author of several articles on 
ways to strengthen the environmental protection system by making 
it more information-driven and performance focused. 
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During the first term of the Clinton Administration, Professor 
Metzenbaum served as Associate Administrator of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency for Regional Operations and 
State/Local Relations. As Associate Administrator, she managed 
the design and. implementation of the National Environmental 
Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) and the Sustainable 
Development Challenge Grant program. Previously, Metzenbaum 
served as Undersecretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of 
Environmental Mfairs (EOEA)., As Undersecretary, she initiated a 
program that certifies private sector third-parties to oversee clean-
ups of contaminated sites, greatly accelerating the clean-up of all 
but the most seriously contaminated sites. She also launched the 
"money-back-guarantee" permit reform program. Under this 
program, which has since been replicated in several states, the 
business community agreed to pay higher fees to cover the cost of 
permit review and compliance assurance and the state committed to 
speedier action-although not assured approval-of permits. Prior 
to serving as Undersecretary, Professor Metzenbaum was Director 
of Capital Budgeting for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
Professor Metzenbaum holds a Ph.D. and Masters degree from the 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a B.A. 
degree in Humanities and Asian Studies from Stanford University. 
Richard Nathan 
Richard Nathan directs the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of 
Government, the public policy research arm of the State University 
of New York, which is located in Albany. Prior to coming to Albany, 
he was a professor at Princeton and before that a Senior Fellow at 
The Brookings Institution. His government service includes 
directing domestic policy research for the National Commission on 
Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and the national 
campaigns of Nelson A. Rockefeller. He was assistant director for 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and deputy 
undersecretary for welfare reform of the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. His books include Implementing the 
Personal Responsibility Act of 1996: A First Look (Rockefeller 
Institute Press, 1999), Turning Promises Into Performance 
(Columbia University Press, 1993), and Social Science in 
Government (Rockefeller Institute Press, 2000). Nathan is an 
advisor to the U.S. General Accounting Office. 
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Erik.D. Olson 
Erik D. Olson joined the National Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) in 1991 as a Senior Attorney, specializing in public health 
issues including drinking water, pesticides, toxics, and food safety. 
Mr. Olson is the National Coordinator of the Campaign for Safe and 
Mfordable Drinking Water, a coalition of over 300 public health, 
environmental, consumer, and other groups dedicated to improving 
drinking water protection. He is also the Coordinator for the D.C. 
Area Water Consumers Organized for Protection (D.C. Area Water 
COPs), a coalition of local citizen, public health, environmental, and 
other groups fighting for better drinking water in the Nation's 
Capital. Erik also sits on the EPA-American Water Works 
Association Research Committee. Until 1997 he served as the 
national environmental group representative on the 
congressionally-chartered National Drinking Water Advisory 
Council. From 1986-1992, he was counsel for the Environmental 
Quality division at the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) , the 
largest environmental group in the country, where he worked on 
pollution issues. He teaches an environmental law seminar at the 
University of Virginia School of Law, and has taught courses in 
environmental law at the University of Maryland. From 1984-1986, 
he was an attorney at the Office of General Counsel, of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, where he litigated 
environmental cases in numerous courts. At EPA's General 
Counsel's office, he worked on the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
hazardous waste, and the Clean Water Act. Olson received his J.D. 
from the University of Virginia and his B.A. in an independently-
created major, Environmental Biology and Management, from 
Columbia University. 
